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The Supreme Court's reasoning in Garcetti v. Ceballos,I a
significant public employee free speech case, raises troublesome
questions because it appears to leave little breathing space for First
Amendment protection for teacher speech in the classroom and for
academic scholarship. In this Article, I argue for a normative approach to
2academic freedom in public elementary and secondary education and in
higher education that takes account of Garcetti but is not over-
determined by it. This normative approach is grounded on the self-
government rationale of the Constitution's text and structure, including
the First Amendment,3 and inquires into the purposes of education in a
Copyright, 2007. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. A.B., U. of Chicago; LL.B., Harvard Law School; M.A., Religious Studies, U.
of Chicago Divinity School. I thank Gina Rinaldi, Chicago-Kent College of Law
Class of 2008, for research assistance. I also thank the First Amendment Law
Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium on Garcetti.
1. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, while
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented in three opinions. See
generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and
§ 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008)
[hereinafter A Critique ofGarcetti v. Ceballos] (analyzing and critiquing Garcetti).
2. For the specific purposes of this Article, I define academic freedom as First
Amendment protection for classroom speech and academic scholarship. I therefore
do not discuss possible First Amendment protection for non-scholarly teacher speech
and writing that occurs outside of the classroom.
3. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (Harper & Brothers 1948) [hereinafter FREE SPEECH]
(explaining that the First Amendment is rooted in self-government); see also
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245 (1961) [hereinafter First Amendment] (arguing that First Amendment protection
involves a government responsibility).
democracy.4 I then address the doctrinal implications of these
educational purposes for academic freedom and the First Amendment.
Painting with a broad First Amendment brush, I conclude that the scope
of academic freedom in elementary and secondary education has not
been changed by Garcetti: it remains quite limited. However, I also
conclude that academic freedom in higher education should not be
governed by Garcetti. Rather, as high-value speech in a democracy, it
deserves maximum First Amendment protection.
1. GARCETTI AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Garcetti did not explicitly involve academic freedom. Rather, it
arose out of a dispute between a deputy district attorney and his
supervisors over the attorney's actions. The attorney informed his
supervisors orally and in a written memorandum of his findings that a
police officer's affidavit in support of a search warrant contained
significant misrepresentations. Thereafter, the attorney alleged, in a
section 1983' suit, that his supervisors retaliated against him in violation
of the First Amendment. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court
revisited and revised its almost forty-year-old decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education6 and declared: "We hold that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
4. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton Univ.
Press 1987) (discussing the purposes of education in a democracy).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (creating a Fourteenth Amendment damages
action against state and local government officials as well as against local
governments). See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 1997, 2008) (analyzing,
in a three-volume treatise, section 1983 cases, issues, and procedures).
6. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Establishing what I call the Pickering three-step, the
Court there held that when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of
public concern (step one), there is an inquiry into the government's interest, such as
the existence of an adverse effect on either the employment relationship or the
functions of the government entity involved (step two), followed by a balancing of
the free speech interest against the government interest (step three). If the free
speech interest outweighs the government interest, the employee is protected against
employer discipline by the First Amendment. However, if the public employee's
speech is on a matter of private concern only, then the First Amendment drops out at
step one, and plays no further role.
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does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. In a
very real sense, Garcetti resurrected the now discreditedi right-privilege
distinction9 in such cases.
Consider the possible academic freedom implications not only for
the classroom speech of teachers at all academic levels, but also for the
scholarship of professors. If Garcetti is taken seriously and read broadly,
then all such speech and scholarship, inherently made pursuant to official
employment duties, is unprotected by the First Amendment from
discipline imposed by elementary, secondary, and higher level
educational officials. Amplifying this concern in Garcetti is the Court's
apparent use of the government speech doctrine in support of its ruling.
Justice Kennedy stated that immunizing public employee speech that is
part of one's job from First Amendment protection against employer
discipline "simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created."1° He then cited
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, quoting
its statement that "when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes.
, 12
The problem is that government speech is presently not covered
by the First Amendment because the government's role as speaker in the
7. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). This created what I call the
new Garcetti four-step: first comes Garcetti's job-required speech inquiry, which, if
satisfied by the public employee, is followed by the Pickering three-step. If the first
(Garcetti) step is not satisfied by the employee-that the speech is a matter of public
concern is irrelevant at this first step-then the First Amendment drops out with
respect to employer discipline.
8. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that
although a person may be denied a valuable government benefit for a variety of
reasons because the benefit is a privilege and not a right, the government may not
deny a benefit for a reason that infringes a person's freedom of speech).
9. The essence of this distinction is captured by Justice Holmes' famous
statement for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman. . . . The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him.").
10. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
11. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
12. Id. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
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marketplace of ideas is considered that of a participant and not that of a
regulator.13 Justice Kennedy's reference to a government speech
justification for the Court's approach in Garcetti may be read as
suggesting that a teacher's classroom speech and a professor's
scholarship are the First Amendment equivalents of government speech,
and as such, unprotected by the First Amendment from official
discipline. Indeed, Justice Souter, in his dissent, argued that the
majority's reliance on a government speech rationale was not justified. 4
In response, Justice Kennedy was almost dismissive; he simply observed
that the facts in Garcetti did not raise an academic freedom issue. At the
same time, however, he acknowledged that "[t]here is some argument
that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted
for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence.""
One might begin a discussion of academic freedom from a
doctrinal perspective in an attempt to discern how conventional First
Amendment doctrines apply to classroom speech and scholarship.
However, I believe that it is more illuminating to take a normative
approach16 in which the following questions are addressed: first, what are
the functions of primary and secondary education and of higher
education in a democracy; and second, what follows normatively from
those functions for academic freedom and the First Amendment? These
questions require us to address self-government, which is the primary
13. See A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra note 1, at 582-83 (discussing
the government speech doctrine).
14. Garcetni, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Ceballos was not paid
to advance one specific policy among those legitimately available, defined by a
specific message or limited by a particular message forbidden."). See also Helen
Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88
B.U. L. REv. 587, 591-92 (2008) (arguing that government speech must be identified
as such, and be transparent, in order to promote the important value of political
accountability and thereby receive immunity from First Amendment scrutiny).
15. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. I argue later, reasoning from the purposes of
education in a democracy, that higher education should be off-limits to Garcetti
because university classroom speech and professorial scholarship constitute a unique
kind of high value speech in a democracy.
16. See PLATO, REPUBLIC (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1945) (explaining Plato's consideration of the characteristics of the ideal
political community and proceeding to discuss the appropriate educational policies
for his Republic under the realm of political theory).
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purpose of the United States Constitution as embedded in its text and
structure, as well as the closely related self-government rationale of the
First Amendment, as famously articulated by Alexander Meiklejohn.1
7
Only then should the relevant academic freedom and First Amendment
doctrines be considered.
II. THE CONSTITUTION, SELF-GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION
Self-government and citizenship are at the core of the United
States Constitution itself, which is a product of the Enlightenment.'8 The
United States was constituted not as a pure democracy but rather as a
republic or representative democracy.' 9 Whether one is a classical
Republican or a Madisonian Republican," citizen participation in self-
government is essential for both survival and progress. Young people
22must be educated to be citizens, even though their education surely
23
includes more, such as the ability to make good life choices. Amy
17. See FREE SPEECH, supra note 3.
18. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-87 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1969) (evaluating the political
and social culture in which the American Republic was formed).
19. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing control of
factions and the advantages of a republic over a democracy).
20. See generally THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST VOL. 1, 15-23 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1981) (detailing original Republican ideas of the
Anti-Federalists, including their stance against a centralized federal government and
against the Constitution).
21. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (arguing for a
strong federal government as opposed to a mere consolidation of the states' powers
in a national government, and defining a true republic as one in which the power to
govern is derived from the people, and in which the representatives are elected from
all of the people).
22. Amy Gutmann calls this conscious social reproduction, meaning the
design by citizens of institutions that shape political values, attitudes and models of
future citizens. GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 14.
23. Famously describing the importance of elementary and secondary
education, the Supreme Court said the following in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
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Gutmann has argued powerfully that education must encourage the
development of moral character, which means an understanding of, and
predisposition toward, life in a democratic society and a willingness to
24deliberate about moral questions. Moral character comprehends the
attributes of truth-telling, tolerance for diversity, and employing
nonviolence to resolve disputes. However, education must go further; it
must ultimately provide for its young people the ability to engage in what
Gutmann calls moral reasoning, meaning the critical faculty of
exercising reasoned deliberation and analysis in order to participate as
25citizens in self-government.
Notice how this concept of education fits comfortably into
26Meiklejohn's self-government explanation for the First Amendment, a
27
rationale reflected in New York Times v. Sullivan. This Article is not the
place to discuss whether this self-government rationale works better than
the Mill/Holmes marketplace of ideas rationale 28 or the self-fulfillment
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
24. GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 41-47.
25. GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 50-52.
26. See First Amendment, supra note 3, at 252. Meiklejohn argues that the
core of the First Amendment is political expression because of its relation to self-
government. Other kinds of expression are important only to the extent they relate to
self-government. He explains: "[T]here are many forms of thought and expression
within the range of human communications from which the voter derives the
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and
objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." First
Amendment, supra note 3, at 256. Of course, Meiklejohn was not the first to
articulate a self-government rationale of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring)
("[Founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; . . .that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
27. 376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
28. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (explaining that "the best test of truth is the power of the
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21and individual autonomy rationale. It is enough for present purposes
that the self-government rationale not only follows from the text and
structure of the Constitution, but also explains the hierarchical character
30of First Amendment jurisprudence better than the alternatives. Just as
the First Amendment plays a crucial educational role in self-
government-citizens educating one another about political matters3 _-it
should also play a crucial role in the education of students for self-
governance.
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
As others have frequently pointed out, 32 the Supreme Court has,
in various First Amendment,33 substantive due process,34 and affirmative
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); see also JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co. Inc.
1978) (stating "that the only way in which a human being can make some approach
to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons
of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by
every character of mind").
29. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 21-55 (The Michie Co. 1984) (arguing that free speech fosters the
development of both intrinsic and instrumental values, which can be grouped
together as "self-realization," and advocating for a balancing test approach to
interpret the First Amendment).
30. Thus, under current First Amendment jurisprudence, political speech is the
most highly protected speech, obscenity, fighting words and threats are unprotected,
and commercial speech is somewhat protected. I argued some time ago that none of
these three conventional rationales, even the self-government rationale, truly
explains First Amendment protection for artistic expression. Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First
Amendment, 1987 WISC. L. REV. 221, 235-43 (1987).
31. Only the First Amendment's Petition Clause protects citizen-to-
government speech; apart from the Religion Clauses, the other clauses protect
citizen-to-citizen speech. Regarding the need for constitutional education of the
people, see Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Education for The People
Themselves, 81 CHi-KENT L. REV. 1091 (2006).
32. E.g., Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value: The Quest to Safeguard
Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L. 111 (2007) (recognizing academic freedom as a
"special concern of the First Amendment" and tracing the origins of the modem
view of academic freedom in an attempt to set the stage for future academic First
Amendment cases (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967));
William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW &
action cases,35 suggested (but not held) that there exists a constitutionally
based teacher's or institution's academic freedom. My focus here is on
the teacher's academic freedom under the First Amendment, and not on
36
that of the institution.
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 81-82 (taking a historical approach to the
Supreme Court's treatment of the First Amendment freedoms of educational
institutions over time and arguing that institutional academic freedom has
progressively developed from earlier notions of general free speech); J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L. J.
251 (1989) (critiquing the roles of the courts and the Constitution in promoting and
protecting academic freedom at the university level and arguing for the autonomy of
higher level educational institutions in determining curriculum, teaching
methodology, student admittance, and faculty appointments).
33. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (treating academic freedom as special
concern of the First Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-403 (1923) (holding
unconstitutional state law prohibiting the teaching in public and private elementary
schools of any modern language but English); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (holding unconstitutional state law requiring students
to attend public schools instead of private schools).
35. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (emphasizing the
importance of "expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment").
36. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions:
Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1497-98 (2007)
(arguing that universities should be considered separate First Amendment entities
and afforded special protection because of the significant role they play in First
Amendment dialogue); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?,
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 907-908 (2006) (evaluating the various institutional and
individual concepts of a right to constitutional academic freedom); Matthew W.
Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 817-19 (1982-
1983) (arguing that academic freedom and institutional autonomy are distinct ideas,
using Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) as a case study). When a
teacher's academic freedom is allegedly abridged, it is ordinarily the result of
challenged conduct that is institutionally based, thereby creating tension between the
teacher's academic freedom and institutional autonomy. For a recent decision
upholding private schools' institutional academic freedom under the First
Amendment, see Assoc. de Educ. Privada de P.R., Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490 F.3d
1, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the selection of textbooks and editions is closely
tied to schools' First Amendment rights, and that any interference by the government
will be subjected to strict scrutiny).
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A. Public Elementary and Secondary Education
37
Academic freedom issues in elementary and secondary education
concern not only what is taught, how and by whom, but also who decides
these matters. Students are a captive audience and, to generalize
overbroadly, they are highly impressionable with underdeveloped critical
faculties.38 Their parents and the school board surely have an important
37. While I address public education because of the Fourteenth Amendment's
state action requirement for First Amendment protection, my normative arguments
should apply to secular private elementary and secondary schools and to universities
as well. See GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 115-23 (discussing the role of private
schools in a democracy).
38. Secondary students have obviously developed, emotionally, more than
their elementary counterparts and are further along in their ability to think critically;
however, for the purpose of analysis of teacher academic freedom, I treat elementary
and secondary students the same: both groups are captive audiences and are, for the
most part, minors unable to vote. Nevertheless, I want to make clear my view that
treating elementary and secondary students the same in a First Amendment setting
may be too simplistic. The latter can surely handle controversial topics and different
viewpoints better. In this vein, consider the opinion of Judge Rovner, concurring in
the judgment in Nuxoll ex rel Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668
(7th Cir. 2008), which involved a lawsuit by a high school student against a school
district and officials. The student alleged that the officials violated his First
Amendment rights by forbidding him to make negative comments about
homosexuality at school by wearing a T-shirt saying "My Day of Silence, Straight
Alliance" on the front and "Be Happy, Not Gay" on the back. Id. at 669-70. Judge
Rovner stated:
Moreover, I heartily disagree with my brothers about the value of
the speech and speech rights of high school students, which the
majority repeatedly denigrates. Youth are often the vanguard of
social change. Anyone who thinks otherwise has not been paying
attention to the civil rights movement, the women's rights
movement, the anti-war protests for Vietnam and Iraq, and the
recent presidential primaries where the youth voice and the youth
vote are having a substantial impact .... The young adults to
whom the majority refers as "kids" and "children" are either
already eligible, or a few short years away from being eligible to
vote, to contract, to marry, to serve in the military, and to be tried
as adults in criminal prosecutions. To treat them as children in
need of protection from controversy, to blithely dismiss their
views as less valuable than those of adults, is contrary to the
values of the First Amendment.
Id. at 677-78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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stake in their education.39 Moreover, while these students should be
starting to develop their critical deliberative faculties and the ability to
engage in moral reasoning, they are, at one and the same time,
developing moral character and attachment to the political community
40through civil religion and sacred political rituals. In addition, they are
learning basic information (mathematics, science, the humanities, social
science, and history) and skills (reading and writing).
Normatively, these considerations suggest a strong and probably
determinative role under the First Amendment for the school board in
deciding what is taught and how (curricular decisions), and by whom
(teacher qualifications). They also suggest very little role, if any, under
the First Amendment for the elementary and secondary teacher in
41
making such decisions. Moreover, students learn outside of the school
setting from their parents, their peers, and the society at large; the school
42board does not have a monopoly on what they learn. Thus, courts have
uniformly ruled, before and after Garcetti, that teachers in elementary
39. See GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 42 (discussing the shared authority of
states, parents, and professional educators in deciding how to cultivate moral
character).
40. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First Amendment, 66
IND. L. J. 511, 539-41 (1991); Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Pledge as Sacred Political
Ritual, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 797, 799-804 (2005). See generally DAVID I.
KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER (Yale Univ. Press 1988) (explaining why
ritual has always been and will continue to be an essential part of political life);
CATHERINE BELL, RITUAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS (Oxford Univ. Press
1997) (surveying the most influential theories of religion and ritual, the major
categories or ritual activity, and the key debates that have shaped our understanding
of ritualism).
41. This indicates a correspondingly limited role for the judiciary in reviewing
(and second-guessing) a school board's curricular and pedagogical decisions when
an elementary or secondary schoolteacher claims academic freedom protection for
classroom speech. This is not to say, of course, that teachers should have no
educational role or input in these matters. See GUTMANN, supra note 4, at 76.
However, the inquiry here is whether the First Amendment should mandate such a
role.
42. Students even have a First Amendment right to learn from one another in
the classroom apart from the curriculum. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that elementary and secondary
students may wear black armbands protesting the Vietnam war in the classroom so
long as they do not create material and substantial interference with the operations of
the school). However, as discussed infra, Tinker's reach has been significantly
limited by the Supreme Court.
2008]
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and secondary education do not have a First Amendment right of
academic freedom to decide for themselves what should be taught and
how. a3 In curricular and pedagogical matters, consequently, there is
precious little First Amendment "breathing space." For better or for
worse educationally, and without running afoul of the First Amendment,
the school board may both write the script and demand that teachers
perform it.a n Garcetti did not change this.
For example, a Seventh Circuit case involved a social studies
teacher who was disciplined for using a classroom session on currentS45
events to express her view on an anti-Iraq War demonstration. The
Seventh Circuit ruled against the teacher, declaring: "[T]he [F]irst
[A]mendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when
conducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or
43. See generally Ronald D. Wenkart, Public School Curriculum and the Free
Speech Rights of Teachers, 214 ED. LAW. REP. 1 (Dec. 28, 2006) (collecting cases on
teacher disregard of the prescribed curriculum, on classroom management
techniques, on the choice of play to be performed, and on the display of
inappropriate materials on school bulletin board).
44. Thus, under this normative approach, a school board may adopt whatever
educational theory or approach it desires, whether open or traditional, or some
combination thereof, so long as it can reasonably be defended as promoting the
development of moral character and the teaching of basic knowledge and skills,
thereby laying the foundation for students to develop their critical faculties and their
ability to engage in moral reasoning in the future. This promotes educational
diversity and is, at the same time, consistent with experimentation, an important
value of federalism. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) for a
classic statement by Justice Brandeis in dissent:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir.
2007). The teacher was told that she could teach about the controversy surrounding
United States military involvement in Iraq, but was to keep her opinions to herself.
Although the Seventh Circuit cited Garcetti, it relied on Webster v. New Lenox Sch.
Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990), for the principle that "public school
teachers must hew to the approach prescribed by principals (and others higher up in
the chain of authority)." Mayer, 474 F.3d at 478-79.
[Vol. 7
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advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the
school system. ' 46 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit ruled against a high
school Spanish teacher who posted "overly religious" materials on his
classroom bulletin board.47 Rejecting the teacher's First Amendment
argument, the Fourth Circuit held that materials posted on a teacher's
bulletin board are curricular in nature and must be related to the subject
48taught. In that case, the materials were not only religious in nature, but
were not related to the teaching of Spanish.
Such results are consistent, I contend, not only with a normative
approach to elementary and secondary education in a democracy, but
also with conventional First Amendment forum analysis and government
speech doctrine. Consistent with forum analysis, the unique functions of
elementary and secondary education in developing moral character and
teaching basic knowledge and skills to minors are taken into account.
That is, government has intentionally created an educational forum
primarily for the purposes of teaching values, basic knowledge, and
skills, with the result that it can restrict speakers, teachers, and students
alike to those purposes in the classroom, and in the curriculum
generally.49 That politically accountable school boards have broad
decision-making authority over curricular and pedagogical matters is also
consistent with the government speech doctrine that allows the
government to engage in content and viewpoint discrimination when it
46. Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480.
47. Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 691, 700 (4th Cir. 2007).
48. Id. at 698. But cf Weathers v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 520 F. Supp. 2d
827, 837 (W.D. La. 2007) (stating, in dictum, that a substitute high school teacher's
art website was characterized not as curricular but rather as the private speech of a
citizen on matters of public concern).
49. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)
(upholding the regulation of the content of school-sponsored student newspaper on
ground that such school-sponsored publications are part of the curriculum), with
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding
the granting of access to interschool mailing system to the union, teachers' exclusive
bargaining representative, and the exclusion of rival teachers' union from that
mailing system), and Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)
(upholding public television station's decision to exclude presidential candidate from
series of debates on ground that he had not generated appreciable voter support and
was not considered serious candidate by the press).
2008]
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
speaks.5° Consequently, though Garcetti did not explicitly address
academic freedom, its rationale is both normatively and doctrinally
appropriate in the elementary and secondary education setting.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already adopted such a curricular
and pedagogically based approach to student speech on school premises.
Despite the broad assertion in 1969 in the famous Tinker v. Des Moines
School District case that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate[,],, 51 the Court has gradually limited
this principle, as applied to students, to the facts in Tinker-a silent,
passive, symbolic expression of opinion on a political topic that was the
subject of prior official viewpoint discrimination. Specifically, the Court
has refused to extend Tinker to a high school student's speech,
containing sexual innuendo, in connection with a student election;52 to a
high school principal's exclusion of stories in a school-sponsored
newspaper;53 and to a high school student's unfurling of a banner,
interpreted as advocating drug use, at a school-sponsored outdoor
activity. 54 In a kind of deconstructive move, the Court has emphasized
the sentences in Tinker that precede and follow the above quote.55 The
sentence immediately preceding states: "First Amendment rights, applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
,,56available to teachers and students. Similarly, a subsequent sentence
states: "On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need
for affirming the comprehensive authority of . . . school officials,
50. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 566-67 (2005)
(finding no First Amendment violation even though government speech was
viewpoint-based and partially funded from nongovernmental source); United States
v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 213-14 (2003) (upholding federal
assistance to public libraries conditioned with the requirement of Internet filtering
software as not violating the First Amendment). The seminal decision for this
concept is Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (finding no First Amendment
violation even though viewpoint-discriminatory conditions were placed on
government subsidies for family planning programs).
51. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
52. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
53. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
54. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
55. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
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consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to . . . control
conduct in the schools.,
57
The common thread in these student cases is the disconnect
between the student's speech on the one hand and the school's asserted
curricular and pedagogical interests on the other, with the latter trumping
the former. As the Court explained in one of these cases:
[S]chool-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether
or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so
long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
58
student participants and audiences.
Significantly, the curricular and pedagogical interests of
elementary and secondary schools identified by the Court in these
student speech cases appear to be the same interests asserted by
elementary and secondary schools that are implicated when teachers
make First Amendment claims of academic freedom in the classroom.
Therefore, under the normative approach suggested here, neither teachers
nor their students in elementary and secondary schools have First
Amendment protection regarding curricular and pedagogical decisions,
regardless of whether the Court ultimately holds that Garcetti applies to
the classroom (and curricular) speech of teachers.59
B. Public Higher Education
Unlike the academic freedom of elementary and secondary
teachers, as to whom, if Garcetti were applied, there would be no
significant change in outcomes, there are serious problems for the
57. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
58. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
59. Recall that even before Garcetti the First Amendment rights of elementary
and secondary teachers in the classroom were almost non-existent.
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continued viability of professorial academic freedom if the rationale of
Garcetti were to control. What is taught in the public university
classroom is surely bought and paid for by the government, as is faculty
scholarship. If Garcetti, together with its categorical balancing, 60 its
citizen-employee distinction, and its government speech approach, were
applied here with blinders, professors would receive no First Amendment
protection from university discipline for the views expressed in
classroom teaching and in their scholarship. However, such an outcome
does not take account of a crucial consideration: unlike elementary and
secondary students, students at the university level are not a captive
audience and, moreover, are legally adults.
Furthermore, a lack of First Amendment protection would be
inconsistent with the democracy-promoting purposes of higher
education: the ability to engage in moral reasoning or, more broadly, the
development of critical intellectual faculties and the advancement of
knowledge.6' Classroom speech in the university and professorial
scholarship are high-value speech deserving maximum First Amendment
protection. As the plurality opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire62 aptly
put it:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident. No one
60. See A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra note 1, at 569-73 (addressing
categorical balancing in Garcetti).
61. As noted infra, it is also inconsistent with the 1940 STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, American Association of
University Professors (1940), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B330-33D3-
4A5 1-B534CEEOC7A90DAB/0/194OStatementofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedom
andTenure.pdf [hereinafter AAUP Statement]. However, in contrast to my
normative approach which is grounded on self-government, the AAUP's primary
rationale appears to be the marketplace of ideas. Thus, the preamble to the AAUP
Statement declares in relevant part:
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common
good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher
or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the
free search for truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom is
essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and
research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement
of truth.
62. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. . . . Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.63
That under Garcetti there would be no First Amendment
protection from university discipline for professorial classroom speech
and scholarship is also inconsistent with First Amendment forum
analysis and government speech doctrine. The university classroom is an
intentionally created educational forum for the enabling of professorial
(and student) speech, per the rationale of Rosenberger.64  University
classroom speech is thus not government speech. Similarly, professorial
scholarship is an intentionally created metaphorical educational forum
for the dissemination of knowledge by academics.65 It, too, is not
government speech. The First Amendment consequence is that the
government should not be allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination
by punishing faculty because of what they say in the classroom or write
in their scholarship.
These characterizations of the university classroom and of
professorial scholarship as intentionally created educational forums
should not depend solely on the subjective intent of state legislators or
university officials, even though there are suggestions of a subjective test
66in various Supreme Court forum cases. Rather, the test should be
63. Id. at 250.
64. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995). This goes beyond mere compatibility of the speech and the public
"property" at issue: here, the university classroom and professorial scholarship are
specifically created for the promotion of high-value speech.
65. Cf Principle 1 of the AAUP Statement, supra note 61, at 3, which
provides in relevant part: "Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other
academic duties .... "
66. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-37 (1990)
(upholding the restriction against solicitation on postal sidewalk as reasonable
because location was not a public forum and activities disrupted postal business);
Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981)
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objective in nature, as Justice Kennedy argued in International Society
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,67 which considered how to
characterize an airport terminal for First Amendment purposes.
Concluding that the airport terminal in question was a public forum, he
argued that the government should not be permitted, under forum
doctrine, to restrict speech by fiat through its "own definition or decision,
unconstrained by an independent duty to respect the speech its citizens
can voice" on public property.68 Rather, "[i]f the objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and
uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive
activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum.
' 69
This objective approach to characterizing the university
classroom and professorial scholarship makes First Amendment sense for
at least two reasons. First, it looks at what actually takes place in
university classrooms and during professorial scholarship activities.
Second, it reflects a long-standing tradition of academic freedom in
American universities that, even if not "time out of mind," goes back to
early in the twentieth century.70 This historical gloss, analogous to the
role of history in the characterization of certain public property such as
(upholding a state agricultural society rule that restricted solicitation to fixed
locations because it was applied equally to all groups and furthered the valid interest
of maintaining order).
67. 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ironically, Justice
Kennedy's reasoning in this case could turn out to limit the applicability of Garcetti
in the university classroom and professorial scholarship settings.
68. Id. at 694-95.
69. Id. at 698. Speaking of institutional academic freedom, Justice Frankfurter
quoted a conference statement from The Open Universities in South Africa in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
"It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation."
70. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (Columbia Univ.
Press 1955) (tracing and analyzing the history of academic freedom in the United
States). Compare Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (where the
Court said: "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us.") and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Where Justice Powell stated: "Academic freedom, though
not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment.").
[Vol. 7
POST-GARCETTI BLUES
streets and parks as traditional public forums,71 supports the carving out
of a special First Amendment role for professorial academic freedom,
even after Garcetti.
Indeed, a special First Amendment high-value speech role for
professorial academic freedom, based in part on tradition, would parallel
the Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the free speech and
associational rights of college students in Healy v. James.72 There, it
ruled in favor of the First Amendment rights of college students to obtain
official campus recognition of a chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the
view that, because of the acknowledged need for order,
First Amendment protections should apply with less
force on college campuses than in the community at
large. . . . The college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we
break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this
Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.73
Soon thereafter the Court applied the reasoning of Healy in
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri74 when it
similarly ruled in favor of a university student expelled for distributing a
newspaper on campus containing indecent but not obscene speech. The
Court explained:
71. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.
72. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
73. Id. at 180-81 (citations omitted).
74. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
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We think Healy makes it clear that the mere
dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to
good taste-on a state university campus may not be
shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.'.
. . [T]he First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community
75with respect to the content of speech ....
Nevertheless, under the First Amendment there are legitimate
educational constraints on professorial academic freedom. In the
classroom, these include the requirement of some relation between
professorial speech and the subject matter that is being taught, as well as
a prohibition against disruptive tactics that interfere with the educational
76process. For example, a Seventh Circuit post-Garcetti case dealt with
student complaints directed at an instructor in a public college's
cosmetology program who distributed anti-gay religious pamphlets to
students she thought were homosexual. She also attempted to lecture
them to change their sexual orientation during classes held in the
college's beauty salon.77 Ruling against the instructor, who sued because
her contract was not renewed, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
although homosexuality was an issue of public concern, the college's
interest in keeping its instructors on message, in conjunction with her
actions' disruptive effect on the educational process, outweighed the
instructor's First Amendment interest.7
75. Id. at 670-71.
76. Under the First Amendment, what constitutes unpermitted material and
substantial interference with the elementary and secondary educational process, see
supra note 42, is surely broader than what, under the First Amendment, constitutes
unpermitted interference with the university classroom. As noted earlier, university
students are adults who are not a captive audience. They can and should be able to
handle unsettling and controversial content, even if it is one-sided, so long as what
the professor expresses in the classroom does not amount to physical disruption,
actual intimidation, threats, obscenity or defamation.
77. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2006).
78. Id. at 671-74. This result is also consistent with Principle No. 2 of the
AAUP Statement, supra note 61, at 3, which provides in relevant part: "Teachers are
entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be
careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject." (emphasis added).
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Finally, there are also legitimate educational constraints on
professorial scholarship under the First Amendment. Perhaps the main
constraint is scholarly standards. The university as employer is surely
entitled to evaluate a professor's fitness through the application of well-
established scholarly standards.7 9
CONCLUSION
In thinking about, and assessing, the possible application of
Garcetti to academic freedom at all educational levels, I maintain that it
makes sense to reason normatively from the purposes of education in a
democracy, as refracted through the Constitution and the First
Amendment, to conclusions about the scope of a teacher's academic
freedom. It follows from this approach that the First Amendment
doctrines for public employee speech and government speech articulated
in Garcetti must not be unthinkingly applied to teacher classroom speech
and professorial scholarship. Rather, the First Amendment protection to
be afforded teacher classroom speech and professorial scholarship must
take account of the purposes of elementary, secondary and higher
education in a democracy. Applying the rationale of Garcetti to the
classroom speech of elementary and secondary teachers is normatively
sound and would, moreover, not change pre-Garcetti First Amendment
outcomes. In marked contrast, professorial academic freedom should be
79. As to professorial speech and non-scholarly writing outside of the
classroom, a subject outside the scope of this Article, consider Principle No. 3 of the
AAUP Statement, supra note 61, at 3-4, which states:
When [college and university teachers] speak or write as citizens,
they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but
their special position in the community imposes special
obligations . . . [so] they should at all times be accurate, should
exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the
opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that
they are not speaking for the institution.
(emphasis added). Interestingly, then, the AAUP's normative distinction between the
speech of the professor as teacher and scholar on the one hand, and the speech of the
professor as citizen on the other, turned out to be significant for First Amendment
purposes 65 years (!) later in Garcetti. Note that under the AAUP's approach, there
nevertheless may be "extramural utterances of the teacher [that] raise grave doubts
concerning the teacher's fitness for his or her position ... " AAUP statement, supra
note 61, at 4.
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off-limits to Garcetti's rationale. Categorical balancing is far too blunt
an instrument to use in determining the scope of professorial academic
freedom. University classroom speech and professorial scholarship,
unique kinds of high value speech, merit maximum First Amendment
protection as befits their extraordinary contribution to democracy.
